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 1 
Re-assembling difference? Rethinking inclusion through/as embodied ethics 
 
This paper considers inclusion through the lens of embodied ethics. It does so by 
connecting feminist writing on recognition, ethics and embodiment to recent examples of 
political activism as instances of recognition-based organizing. In making these 
connections, the paper draws on insights from Judith Butler’s recent writing on the ethics 
and politics of assembly in order to re-think how inclusion might be understood and 
practiced. The paper has three inter-related aims: (i) to emphasize the importance of a 
critical reconsideration of the ethics and politics of inclusion given, on the one hand, its 
positioning as an organizational ‘good’ and on the other, the conditions attached to it; (ii) 
to develop a critique of inclusion, drawing on insights from recent feminist thinking on 
relational ethics, and (iii) to connect this theoretical critique of inclusion, re-considered 
here through the lens of embodied ethics, to assembly as a form of feminist activism. Each 
of these aims underpins the theoretical and empirical discussion developed in the paper, 
specifically its focus on the relationship between embodied ethics, the interplay between 
theory and practice, and a politics of assembly as the basis for a critical reconsideration of 
inclusion. 
 
Key words: inclusion; embodied ethics; Judith Butler; assembly; recognition; relationality 
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 2 
Introduction 
It is perhaps not surprising that diversity has been the subject of a growing body of critical 
research within work and organization studies (Ahmed, 2012; Ahonen et al, 2014; Ahonen 
and Tienari, 2015; Costea and Introna, 2008; Swan, 2010, 2016). Whether articulated 
through ‘trenchant formulations or transient fashions’ (Oswick and Noon, 2014: 286), a 
seemingly ubiquitous rhetorical commitment to diversity represents not just a problematic 
managerial discourse, but also a powerful one (Zanoni, 2011; Zanoni and Janssens, 2004, 
2015; Zanoni et al, 2010). Critical research has highlighted how the management of 
diversity has become an increasingly dominant way in which differences between people 
are not simply classified and governed, but are ‘made up’ (Dahl, 2014), that is, brought 
into being specifically in order to be appropriated. Through this reificatory process, lived 
multiplicities and their intersectional complexities become knowable and therefore 
manageable categories so that projected (‘protected’) characteristics can be co-opted as 
organizational resources in the service of the business case. The writings of thinkers as 
diverse as Bourdieu (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2011; Tatli, 2011), Foucault (Ahonen and 
Tienari, 2015; Ahonen et al, 2014) and Kristeva (Vachhani, 2014) have been drawn on to 
inform an increasingly rich and theoretically sophisticated critique of this co-optation.  
 Evolving from this body of work, critical scholars have argued for some time that 
in place of diversity, a theoretical and political commitment to ‘inclusion’ is something 
that we should be striving for (see Katila et al, 2010). Inclusion is a compelling force, 
itself emerging from a critique of the instrumental and individualizing tendencies of its 
US-originating predecessor, diversity. Yet, inclusion has also been subject to critique – as 
‘old wine in new bottles’ (Nkomo, 2014) and as a managerial buzzword that needs 
‘anchoring’ (Dobusch, 2014). Drawing on feminist writing on recognition, embodiment 
and ethics, I argue here that inclusion, whilst appealing, requires some reflexive re-
thinking, both in order to question our own practices and assumptions (Holck and Muhr, 
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2014) and to underpin ‘a more theoretically informed orientation towards practice and 
activism’ (Ahonen et al, 2014: 263). With this in mind, this paper seeks to draw together 
insights from critical discussions within work and organization studies focusing on the 
organizational process and politics of inclusion, and feminist writing on recognition, 
embodiment and ethics. The theoretical critique developed and the case that is made for 
re-thinking inclusion through embodied ethics is illustrated with reference to two recent 
examples of political activism: the anti-homophobic vigils held after the mass shootings at 
Pulse, an Orlando nightclub in June 2016, and the Women’s Marches that took place on 
the first full day of Donald Trump’s US presidency in January 2017. 
 Inspired by feminist thinking on the politics of assembly (Butler, 2015), and by 
recent writing on embodied ethics within work and organization studies, the aim of the 
paper is to contribute to a critical and reflexive questioning of the presumption that 
inclusion is by definition a ‘good thing’, and something that feminist scholars and activists 
ought to champion. Throughout the paper, inclusion is understood not just as a practice 
that may or not take place within organizations but rather, as an organizational process in 
itself. Thinking about inclusion as a process of organization is (hopefully) more than just a 
semantic game, but represents a conceptual shift that encourages critical reflection on 
whether work and organization studies should look to move beyond inclusion, exploring 
alternative concepts to communicate how difference, as a complex and dynamic 
multiplicity (Benjamin, 1995; Harding et al, 2012; Linstead and Pullen, 2006), might be 
lived and experienced within organizational life beyond the confines of inclusion. 
The discussion begins with a review of relevant literature on (i) inclusion in work 
and organization studies, particularly within the growing sub-field of critical diversity 
studies, and (ii) feminist scholarship on recognition and ethics. Here and throughout the 
paper, recognition is understood in the Hegelian sense of a struggle for reciprocal 
affirmation of our inter-subjective viability, narrated in Hegel’s own writing on the 
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master-slave dialectic, and developed in feminist writing particularly by De Beauvoir’s 
(2011) reading of Hegel in her critique of woman as man’s Other (as the object to his 
subject), and by feminist recognition theorists who have drawn on her work such as 
Jessica Benjamin (1990, 1995). In feminist hands, recognition is understood as ‘the 
embodied, practical and cooperative character of the self-other relation’ and is framed as 
‘dialogical, situated in cultural and social contexts and generated through embodied 
practice’ (Harding et al, 2012: 57). Having examined this literature, the paper then goes on 
to focus specifically on some of the difficulties associated with ‘doing difference’ in and 
through contemporary organizations, before turning to Butler’s (2015) recent writing on 
assembly as a conceptual framework through which to re-think inclusion through an 
embodied, recognition-based ethics premised upon an inter-corporeal, relational 
recognition of difference. By assembly, Butler (2015: 8) refers to those forms of standing 
together (literally and symbolically) that signify an ‘embodied and plural performativity’. 
Assemblies, she argues, materialize a simple, but powerful and effective assertion of the 
right to appear beyond the permitted conditions or normative terms governing doing so. 
The two examples referred to above are considered as illustrations of how a politics of 
assembly, premised upon an ethics of recognition, might take us beyond an instrumental 
orientation towards inclusion within and through organizational processes. As examples of 
activist organising, the post-Pulse vigils and the Women’s Marches are offered as 
examples of the collective, performative capacity of assembly as a form of ‘standing 
together’ that powerfully connects bodies, ethics and practices in opposition to normative 
regimes governing recognition in the name of ‘inclusion’.  
The aims of the paper are threefold: (i) to emphasize the importance of a critical 
reconsideration of the ethics and politics of inclusion within work and organization studies 
given, on the one hand, its positioning as an organizational ‘good’ and on the other, the 
normative conditions attached to it; (ii) to develop a critique of inclusion as it is currently 
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understood and practiced within work organizations, drawing on insights from recent 
feminist thinking on embodied ethics, and (iii) to connect the theoretical critique of 
inclusion, re-considered here through the lens of embodied ethics, to assembly as a form 
of organizational practice and activism. In pursuing these three aims, the feminist writing 
on recognition and embodied ethics to which we now turn provides an insightful starting 
point for a critique of inclusion, and constitutes an important contribution to the growing 
body of critical diversity studies literature. 
  
Inclusion, recognition and embodied ethics  
 
Embodied ethics broadly refers to the idea that the basis of our ethical relationship to one 
another is our embodied inter-connection and the mutual, corporeal vulnerability that 
arises from this. Recognition of the organizational potential and implications of this 
ethical relationship has been a strong theme in feminist and pro-feminist writing within 
work and organization studies in recent years (Dale and Latham, 2015; Hancock, 2008; 
2015). Much of this literature is either directly or indirectly premised upon a post-dualistic 
understanding of subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty, 2002) that thinks of embodied ethics as not 
simply a moral obligation but an ontological compulsion. We exist in and through our 
own bodies but also those of others, because our mode of being, our embodied ontology, 
means that we encounter ourselves and others through the medium of our bodies, and 
because of this, we are inter-corporeally dependent upon each other; we are ‘intertwined’ 
(Merleau Ponty, 1968). This basic presupposition constitutes the philosophical and 
political basis of Butler’s (2015: 122, emphasis added) relational ethics emphasizing that 
‘it is not from pervasive love for humanity or a pure desire for peace that we strive to live 
together. We live together because we have no choice’. 
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For Butler (2015: 197), assemblies consist simply of a recognition-based bodily 
presence, a ‘collective thereness’ (ibid: 197), enabling assembled bodies to ‘enact a 
message, performatively’ (ibid: 197) in a way that connects this relational ethics to 
politics. Assemblies are premised, she argues, on recognition of our shared inter-corporeal 
vulnerability, the basic need that we have for reciprocation, rather than some reified notion 
of ascribed characteristics. For Butler, our mutual, inter-corporeal dependency means that 
we are all vulnerable, but in a hierarchically organised society, some people are clearly 
much more vulnerable than others. In practice, this means that while we are all 
ontologically ‘dispossessed’ by our dependency upon one another, and by our need for 
mutual recognition, the materialities of our social, political and economic circumstances 
mean that we are not all equally or homogenously so (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013). 
These are themes and concepts to which we return below, drawing on insights from Butler 
and other feminist thinkers. Exploring these inequalities, and the political potential of 
embodied assemblage to challenge them, Butler (2015) considers a question posed by 
Adorno (2005: 39) when he asserts that a ‘wrong life cannot be lived rightly’. Thinking of 
this as an organizational problem raises some important questions that will be considered 
in this paper: Is it possible to live an inclusive life in an exclusionary one (in other words, 
a life in which the inclusion of some is premised upon the exclusion of others)? What 
might this mean, in terms of the conditions of inclusion? How might these conditions be 
subject to critique, and re-thought, through the lens of feminist writing on embodied 
ethics? And how might this theoretical critique inform feminist activism, and 
organizational practice? These questions, and those outlined above, are explored here with 
reference to feminist writing on recognition and embodied ethics, and particularly Butler’s 
work on assembly as form of political engagement and activism. Framing these questions 
as organizational challenges requires us to consider how inclusion might be thought about 
and practiced beyond, on the one hand, a logic of exclusion, and on the other, an 
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instrumental co-optation of difference. It also requires us to think about what 
organizational forms an embodied, relational ethics of recognition might take.  
 
 In working through these kinds of questions, the discussion below proceeds from 
the premise that inclusion is a basic human need - because of the reliance we have on one 
another, we need it as a sign of our recognition. This means that inclusion is necessary as 
it signals a reciprocal acknowledgement of our underlying inter-connectedness, and of our 
need to live free of domination, violence (Benjamin, 1995), exploitation and oppression 
(Fraser, 2000), and within social relations of reciprocity in which each affirms the 
presence and subjective viability of the other (McNay, 2008). In other words, we need 
recognition to make meaningful ‘the feelings, intentions, and actions of the self’ 
(Benjamin, 1990: 12).  
Central to feminist writing on recognition is an Hegelian understanding of 
recognition as a process through which Self and Other come to a mutual understanding of 
each as reflected in the other. Feminist readings have emphasized how this reflection does 
not have to result in a collapse of the Self into the Other ‘through an incorporative 
identification, … or a projection that annihilates the alterity of the Other’ (Butler, 2000: 
272). Yet in Hegelian terms, the desire for recognition carries with it the perpetual risk of 
negation or misrecognition; it is precisely this risk that needs to be worked through in 
order to open up the possibility of mutual recognition. This paradox means that thinking 
about recognition as both a normative ideal to be worked towards, and as a template for 
political activism – as a process of struggle - is crucial to feminist approaches that 
effectively ‘strive for the triumph of recognition over aggression’ (Butler, 2000: 274)
i
.  
If to recognize ‘is to affirm, validate, acknowledge, know, accept, understand, 
empathize, take in, appreciate, see, identify with, find familiar … love’ (Benjamin, 1990: 
15-16), we might argue that recognition epitomizes many of the qualities of social 
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relations that we would hope to associate with inclusion. As Ahmed (2000: 22) reminds 
us, recognition means ‘to know again, to acknowledge and to admit’, implying a process 
of inclusion premised upon a recollection, a ‘knowing again’, of our basic connections to 
others, and of a sense of collective identification, or belonging (‘admission’). But because 
of the conditions attached to inclusion as an organized form of recognition the question 
becomes, does inclusion make lives more of less recognizable and therefore, livable
ii
?  
As Butler notes, Adorno’s question cited above takes different forms depending on 
when and where it is posed, and by whom, but it generally raises a basic problem: How to 
live one’s life well in a world in which a good life is foreclosed to so many. The risk here 
being that of living a good life not just in spite of but because of the bad life lived by 
others so that one person or group’s ‘inclusion’ is a result of others’ exclusion. Adorno’s 
own response to this question emphasizes that the constant temptations of complicity must 
be kept in check, so that the political and ethical terms of inclusion must be continually 
questioned. In itself, this suggests something important about the ethical templates 
governing the compulsion to perform subjectivities that might elicit recognition in the 
form of inclusion, reminding us of the ever-present trap of living difference not 
‘inclusively’ but in collusion within and through organizational life.  
Difference is taken here, and throughout the paper, to refer to those points of dis-
identification and dissimilarity that come to be experienced or perceived as socially, 
politically and ethically significant, and which are produced and reproduced in ‘on-going, 
context-specific processes’ (Zanoni et al, 2010). In sociological terms, difference both 
reflects existing power relations within a given context, sustaining inequality, oppression, 
marginalization and discrimination, and contributes to maintaining, resisting and/or 
transforming those relations. In philosophical terms, particularly from a critical, feminist 
perspective, difference emerges when the relationship between Self and Other comes to be 
organized in binary terms, and ordered hierarchically, so that the inter-subjective 
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relationality that underpins embodied social relations and processes of recognition is 
arrested into a state of perpetual mis- or non-recognition, resulting in relations 
characterized by the Other’s negation. Ahmed (2012) emphasizes this when she argues 
that difference emerges not from characteristics attributable to ‘protected groups’, or to an 
individual’s presumed capacity, but rather from the relationship between Self and Other, 
once that relationship becomes a form of hierarchical oppression or exploitation. In her 
discussion of racialization and nationalism, inclusion is read, in this respect, as a 
technology of governance, a ‘repair’ plan as it were, through which strangers can be made 
into subjects as long as they ‘consent to the terms of inclusion’ (Ahmed, 2012: 163). This 
process, she argues, simply brings those involved closer to those norms that have 
historically excluded them, resulting not in genuine freedom but rather in increasing 
subjection to the negating regimes of normative violence. Difference, in this sense, 
operates ‘as a strategy of containment’ (Swan, 2010), as Virdee (2014) has recently 
illustrated in his discussion of the ‘racialized outsider’. But it can also function as a co-
optation of that difference. What the ‘business case’ arguably seeks to recoup from this 
negation of the Other, as noted in the critical diversity research, is an unreflexive, often 
self-congratulatory reclamation of difference in the service of organizational performance.   
As Swan (2016) in particular emphasizes, critical diversity research grew out of 
opposition to the North American positivist, prescriptive preoccupation with ‘managing 
diversity’: the idea that organizations can harness difference as the emerging ‘problem’ of 
a demographically changing workforce. Drawing variously on discourse analysis, critical 
theory, feminism and postcolonial theory, critical diversity studies brings a concern with 
power, inequality and social justice to the fore (Zanoni and Janssens, 2004; Janssens and 
Zanoni, 2005). Critical diversity research has highlighted how inequalities are reproduced 
or even accentuated when organizations instrumentally deploy difference, co-opting 
diversity as an organizational resource or strategic aspiration (Zanoni et al, 2010). Critical 
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approaches also scrutinize practices of domination and subordination that condition the 
production of knowledge about diversity (Zanoni and Calás, 2014). Highlighting both 
issues, Swan (2010) shows how diversity is normalized in advertising through a selective 
recognition of difference in order to manufacture a particular image that does not make 
dominant groups feel responsible for social justice or reform. Most fundamentally, as 
Ahonen and Tienari (2015: 273) highlight, the ‘upbeat naiveté’ of the business case severs 
diversity from its history of social oppression and political struggle, ‘re-framing difference 
as an accumulation of individual attributes through which organizational performance can 
be pursued and competitive advantage secured’ (Ahonen and Tienari, 2015: 278). This 
simultaneously neglects established power relations and structural inequalities, 
essentializing difference (Ashcraft, 2009; Zanoni and Janssens, 2004). As Ahmed and 
Swan (2006: 96) have put it, managing diversity ‘individuates difference, conceals 
inequalities and neutralizes histories of antagonism and struggle’.  
As Swan (2016) has recently argued, difference has been a central concept within 
theoretical debates shaping critical diversity studies. Yet as she goes on to note, to date 
there has been little explicit engagement with theoretical or philosophical ideas, including 
those connecting a critique of inclusion to feminist politics and ethics. Swan’s own work 
is among the exceptions to this, with the ontological focus of her writing being largely on 
how difference is produced through processes of Othering. As she puts it, ‘diversity 
management cannot let the Other be Other’ (Swan, 2016: 372). Yet this position can be 
something of a practical and political dead end in terms of its prospects for findings ways 
of living and working together beyond the negating effects of exclusion, or the 
assimilatory consequences of over-inclusion. Swan’s own response to this reflexive 
dilemma draws from Ahmed’s (2000, 2002) argument that it is the mode of encounter 
with the Other rather than the latter’s ontological status that can open up the possibility of 
recognizing rather than containing or assimilating the Other’s difference. For Ahmed, 
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however, the containing effects of media culture, combined with the wrenching of social 
relations from their political contexts and historical processes, serves to close off the 
openness on which such ethical encounters depend, producing instead a ‘stranger fetish’ 
(Ahmed, 2000: 3) through which the Other is encountered as an ontological given. Her 
critical reflections on this process and its implications for politics and ethics mean that, for 
Ahmed (2000: 6), it is important to consider ‘how the stranger is an effect of processes of 
inclusion and exclusion’.  
With this in mind, critical diversity scholars have appealed for contributions that 
‘actively search for new, emancipating forms of organizing’ (Zanoni et al, 2010: 11), 
arguing that it is time for the critical diversity literature to move towards a ‘reconstructive 
reflexivity’ that could focus on exploring ‘practices and interventions reflecting an 
affirmative, engaged and pragmatic ethos’ (Zanoni et al, 2010: 11 and 12). Connecting 
this specifically to feminist politics and organizational practice, the question then becomes 
not how difference can be made to fit into an organizational norm, but rather how 
difference has the potential to rupture the normative conditions and corporate imperatives 
governing its organization. Recent writing within work and organization studies on 
embodied ethics, to which we now turn, emphasizes the importance of mutual recognition 
of our inter-corporeal vulnerability to this potential rupturing. 
 While Pullen and Rhodes (2015) and Hancock (2008) draw predominantly on 
feminist writer Rosalyn Diprose’s work on an inter-corporeal ethics of generosity, Dale 
and Latham (2015) turn directly to Merleau Ponty and Levinas in their discussion of the 
embodied experiences of people with disabilities. They argue that organizations both 
produce boundaries that circumvent our basic intertwining (in Ahmed’s terms, producing 
disabled people as ‘strangers’), at the same time as holding the potential for such 
boundaries to be contested, advocating a proximal politics based on an ‘ethics of 
Page 11 of 35
ScholarOne support: (434) 964-4100
Human Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
CONFIDENTIAL: for peer review only
 12
entangled embodiment’ (Dale and Latham, 2015: 178) that recognizes inter-corporeality 
and the ways in which organizations make difference.  
 Developing similar themes, Kenny and Fotaki (2015), drawing on Ettinger, argue 
for an inter-corporeal organizational ethics premised upon a relational subjectivity that 
emphasizes mutual interconnection and responsibility. They stress, in particular, how 
one’s sexed, gendered or racialized bodily presence might form the basis of a disavowal of 
inter-subjective vulnerability, resulting in the subjection or exploitation of others. 
Developing this theme politically, and drawing on Levinas and Spinoza, Thanem and 
Wallenberg (2015) emphasize how our collective ethical responsibility, our basic, 
embodied sociality, becomes subsumed through dominant organizational preoccupations 
such as personal achievement, individual freedom and self-development.  
 What insights such as these suggest is that the terms of inclusion mean that those 
who are positioned or who identify as different are not allowed simply to ‘be’ different; 
whether deviating from a sexual, gender, class, race or ethnic norm, or a physical or 
aesthetic one, difference is something that has to be continually worked on in order to 
conform to the normative ideals shaping inclusion. This ‘working’ or organizing of 
difference is compelled by organizational policies and practices that involve, on the one 
hand, difference’s constraint and containment (Swan, 2010), and on the other, its 
compulsion and commodification. Taken together, these twin processes mean that 
inclusion is practiced in the name of performance, functionality and instrumentalism 
(Knights, 2015)
iii
, within the broader context of a market-based discourse of diversity that 
forecloses inter-subjective recognition (Hancock, 2008; Kenny and Bell, 2014). To 
paraphrase Swan (2010), Ahmed (2012) and Ahonen and Tienari (2015), inclusion 
becomes an instrumental recognition of difference on organizational terms. From a 
critical, feminist perspective, this instrumental organization of difference distorts, rather 
than fosters, recognition as difference comes to be governed by a code of domination, and 
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an accumulation imperative, rather than an ethic of mutuality (Benjamin, 1990). Framed in 
this way, inclusion becomes, to borrow from Benjamin, a ‘twisting’ of the trust relations 
on which recognition depends not through a repression of the desire for recognition, but 
through its enlisting as a strategic, organizational resource (see also Swan, 2010, 2016).  
 In developing a critique of this ‘two pronged attack’ on difference, and in 
exploring possible alternative ways forward that connect feminist theory and activism, 
Judith Butler’s (2015) recent writing on assembly provides valuable insights that build on 
the feminist ideas from which the organizational scholars cited above have drawn. In 
particular, Butler’s concept of assembly speaks to the questions posed above: How might 
inclusion be understood and practiced beyond a sameness/difference ‘binary 
fundamentalism’ (Knights, 2015)
iv
, and how might it be possible to live an inclusive life in 
an exclusionary one, at the same time as avoiding the (ontological and ethical) trap of 
living difference ‘in collusion’. In considering these issues, my aim below is to develop a 
recognition-based critique of organizational inclusion drawing on Butler’s Notes Towards 
a Performative Theory of Assembly, arguing that finding ways of embodying difference 
and of relating to one another beyond constraint and co-optation constitutes an urgent and 
timely task for feminist theory and practice. I do this with reference to a discussion of (i) 
the vigils that were held after the mass shootings at Pulse, an Orlando nightclub in June 
2016, and (ii) the Women’s Marches that took place in January 2017 on the first full day 
of Donald Trump’s presidency, arguing that the concept of assemblage provides an 
interesting way of thinking about the significance and ‘rupturing’ potential of these forms 
of activism as political assemblies premised upon recognition rather than inclusion. 
 
Butler on dispossession, recognition and relationality 
 
Page 13 of 35
ScholarOne support: (434) 964-4100
Human Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
CONFIDENTIAL: for peer review only
 14
The basic premise of Butler’s writing is that everyone is dependent on each other in order 
to maintain a livable life (Butler, 2015). Yet at the same time, that dependency (while not 
the same as subjugation
v
) can easily become the mechanism for subjugation when 
recognition is conditional. This implies, as considered thus far, that inclusion is an 
organizational exploitation of our need to belong, that is, of our basic need for recognition. 
  To reiterate, the theoretical basis of Butler’s discussion of assembly is a critical, 
feminist reading of the Hegelian dialectics of recognition
vi
 and a phenomenological 
understanding of the self as a situated, inter-corporeal ‘relational sociality’ (Butler and 
Athanasiou, 2013: 65). The latter leads Butler to argue that it is our ethical relationality – 
our embodied relationship of mutual inter-dependency - that defines us (Butler, 2000). In 
her critical reflections on the differentiating effects of the normative regimes governing 
this relationality that resonate strongly with the critique of inclusion considered above, 
Butler argues that rather than mutual recognition, these regimes render others usable, 
exploitable and ‘eventually into waste matter, or of no use: always available, always 
expendable’ (Butler, 2015: 27). The political potential of this critique lies in its capacity to 
open up radical re-articulations of what it means to matter: ‘rather than a rehabilitation of 
the humanist subject in the form of liberal tolerance or assimilatory inclusion of ready-
made identities’ (Butler, 2015: 34, emphasis added), Butler’s explicit aim is to move us 
towards a relational ethics and politics premised upon recognition (see also Benjamin, 
1995). 
 It is in this respect that, in dialogue with Athanasiou (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013) 
and developing themes introduced in her earlier work (Butler, 1988, 1990, 1993), Butler 
introduces the concept of ‘dispossession’ to her critique. For Butler, dispossession is the 
collective, political corollary of undoing that she explored at a more individual level in her 
earlier writing (Butler, 2004). Her account is premised on the view that there is, on the one 
hand, a relational form of dispossession that must be valued
vii
, and on the other, a 
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privative form that must be opposed. In this sense, it is presumed that the former, a 
relational precarity, is shared equally as part of the human condition (as a consequence of 
our need for recognition), while the latter, ‘precarity as a condition of induced inequality 
and destitution … is a way of exploiting [this] existential condition’ (Butler and 
Athenasiou, 2013: 20). In practice, this means that, on the one hand, ‘the self is always in 
relational sociality’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 65). As discussed above, this is 
because, through our inter-corporeality, ‘we are implicated in … intense social processes 
of relatedness and interdependence’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 55), so that, in this 
sense, we are always ‘dispossessed’ by others as we are affected by them, and in turn 
affect others through our basic need for mutual recognition. Yet at the same time, we are 
also dispossessed, in a more ‘privative’ way, by normative powers that serve to exploit 
and oppress our desire to be recognized. 
In contrast to ‘the governmental logics of tolerance’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 
66) that ‘seek to govern and enclose ontologically, possessively’ our basic relationality, 
what is needed, Butler argues, is not a politics of inclusion. The latter, she emphasizes, is 
far too susceptible to what she calls ‘the market of recognition’. Rather, we should work 
to destabilize (or ‘make trouble’ with, to borrow from her earlier writing – see Butler, 
1990) the regulatory ideals that constitute this susceptibility. In other words, we should 
look to find ways to draw on the collective, political potential of relationality in order to 
recognize, and address, more privative forms of dispossession. In effect, this suggests 
turning inclusion back on itself, revealing its tendency to appropriate and exploit our need 
for recognition while professing to do precisely the opposite. 
In organizational terms, and with the questions outlined above in mind, this raises 
two important issues to consider. First, lived experiences of the dynamics of exclusion and 
inclusion shaping the pursuit of recognition, as well as the performative labour - the work 
involved in bringing particular subjectivities into being in order to conform to normative 
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regimes of intelligibility and recognition. Thanem and Wallenberg (2016) describe very 
poignantly the emotional strain and pain of this kind of labour when it involves, for 
instance, repressing transgender, as well as the effort and concentration (the performative 
labour
viii
) involved in conforming to organizational/organizing gender norms and 
expectations. Second, the significatory processes through which patterns of exclusion and 
over-inclusion come to shape lived experiences of organizational settings and processes. 
The latter in particular help us to understand more about how organizations that formally 
proclaim a commitment to equality continue to practice inclusion is a way that simply 
perpetuates exclusion
ix
. As Thanem and Wallenberg (2016: 268) emphasize in their 
discussion of gender fluidity, while organizations may formally, rhetorically espouse an 
ethos of openness to difference they ‘typically depict people who do gender 
appropriately’. Ahmed (2012) reaches a similar conclusion in her critique of institutional 
racialization in organizational cultures. 
 To sum up thus far, the critique of organizational inclusion outlined above 
distinguishes between, as Butler puts it, (i) the exclusion of ‘that which gets abjected or 
foreclosed’, and (ii) the over- or conditional inclusion of ‘forms of life that are conferred 
recognition … according to the established norms of recognizability, on the condition of 
and at the cost of conforming to these norms’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 36). In 
organizational terms, this produces an alienating, abjecting exclusion on the one hand or 
an ‘assimilatory inclusion’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 34) on the other. The latter 
Povinelli (2002) has described as a compulsion to embody an ascribed, ‘authenticity’ that 
effectively converts recognition into nothing more than a reified form of difference 
articulated through a rhetorical commitment to inclusion; the ‘stranger fetish’, in Ahmed’s 
(2000) terms.  
 Proceeding from this critique requires careful thinking about how organizational 
life might be made not more ‘inclusive’ (Katila et al, 2010), risking with it a perpetuation 
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of exclusion or (conditional) over-inclusion and a reification of difference, but relational 
where the latter is taken to mean open to difference, rather than seeking to control or 
contain it.  
 Drawing together insights from the feminist work considered above, from critical 
diversity research, and from Butler’s writing considered thus far, an important first step 
towards re-thinking inclusion through embodied ethics has to be to explore how the twin 
strategies of exclusion and over-inclusion of difference outlined above might be unsettled, 
ruptured or ‘troubled’ (Butler, 1990). In some of her most recent work, Butler (2015) 
emphasizes that this unsettling can take the form of a radical, affective solidarity enacted 
in opposition to the precarious effects of contemporary political and economic forces, 
enabling a new sense of mattering to emerge – interdependent, relational and persistent.  
 
Practicing assembly as recognition-based activism 
 
Two examples are considered here to illustrate what this sense of mattering as a 
recognition-based assembly might mean in practice. The first relates to the politics of grief 
and collective expressions of solidarity embodied through the candlelit vigils that were 
organized in the immediate aftermath of the mass shootings at the Pulse nightclub in 
Orlando, Florida on 12th June 2016, when 49 people were killed, and 53 more were 
seriously injured
x
. Writing on the collective mourning that took place after the shootings, 
Laing (2016) reflects on neo-liberal media attempts to erase homophobia from the event, 
as it came to be reframed by right-wing commentators in particular as an attack on 
‘Western freedoms’, whatever that might mean. Laing (2016) asks: ‘What can we do? 
How can we be visible, especially if we exist in the blind spot between accepted 
definitions? We can keep finding language, we can keep insisting on our presence, our 
right to exist’ (Laing, 2016: 5, emphasis added). Facebook pages and other social media 
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sites were set up to provide ‘a peaceful space for honoring, remembering and grieving’ as 
the Candlelight Vigil page described it. Mass vigils were held days, weeks and months 
after the shootings in parks and public spaces demonstrating widespread global support for 
the victims and their families. Rainbow banners were displayed, and flags flew at half-
mast over public buildings and organizations across many parts of the world. What was 
arguably most notable about these vigils was the sheer sense of standing together, of 
embodying and recognizing opposition to homophobia in all its forms, as the many images 
on websites and social media illustrate.  
This response was by no means unproblematic, however. Ramirez et al (2017) 
emphasize the need for more intersectional research on LGBTQ-POC’s (People of Colour) 
identities and experiences noting that Pulse was hosting a Latin Pride event on the night of 
the attack, yet much of the response erased or retired these intersectionalities. Park (2016) 
argues that social media responses to the shootings raise questions about how to grieve 
LGBTQ losses while avoiding ‘grief tourism’. For Park, global articulations of a shared 
‘we’ (through various social media hashtags and fundraising initiatives, for instance, as 
well as slogans such as ‘we all share one pulse’) served to homogenize rather than 
recognize the specificities of those closest to the victims, and to the communities most 
directly effected. Criticizing these kinds of presumptions, Park argues that the kind of 
grief ‘tagging’ that can occur in the aftermath of tragic events such as the Pulse shootings 
can seem insincere, unseemly and trite. The problem, he argues, is largely the impact of a 
digital age in which performative displays of mourning can become part of self-branding. 
Yet Park (2017: 5, emphasis added) also acknowledges that social media played an 
important role in connecting the people who took part in vigils, describing these as 
‘organized networks of care and solidarity’. Sharing this political optimism, Ganesh 
(2017) describes the vigils as ‘mobilizing events’ providing opportunities to embrace, both 
literally and metaphorically, a sense of connection and community beyond the boundaries 
Page 18 of 35
ScholarOne support: (434) 964-4100
Human Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
CONFIDENTIAL: for peer review only
 19
of heteronormative kinship
xi
. In Butler’s (2015) terms, what these vigils potentially 
represent is an embodied relationality – a standing together to oppose homophobia 
through a recognition-based collective presence. The vigils, as poignant examples of what 
she means by a plural performativity, illustrate the capacity of assembly – organised 
opposition to induced, or privative precarity through a recognition of shared, inter-
corporeal vulnerability and the ethics of relationality engendered by that vulnerability. 
A second example, the pro-feminist global demonstrations that took place on 21
st
 
January 2017 (the day after Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration) are but one recent 
instance of a long history of feminist activism, but an important one nevertheless. Their 
sheer scale and widespread level of support lend a very ‘immediate’ credence to Walby’s 
(2011) observation that we are in the midst of a historically significant fourth feminist 
‘circuit’, one that makes effective use of social media. Estimates put the number of people 
involved at around 4.5 million (Sang and Lyon, 2017). Hereafter referred to as the 
Women’s Marches, these demonstrations were part of a global movement of opposition to 
gender oppression, initiated in the US but rapidly spreading across sixty countries, to 
challenge Trump, support women’s rights and champion equality. Setting off from 
Grosvenor Square, where the US Embassy is based, and ending in Trafalgar Square, over 
150,000 people joined the London March, support for which gathered unprecedented 
momentum through social media. Indeed, social media played a particularly important role 
in their organization, lending credence to McLaughlin et al’s (2011) argument that 
developing technologies and cultural practices might enable new forms of feminist 
activism and identification to emerge, including those responding to collective demands 
for social justice that challenge established terms of recognition and conditions of 
inclusion (see also Munro, 2013). The numbers involved far exceeded the organizers’ 
expectations, with those taking part ‘seemingly coming together across boundaries of 
class, occupations, materialities, genders, races and sexualities’ (Humm, 2017: 6). Again, 
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this is illustrated by the many images on social media and other websites, depicting the 
sheer scale of the Marches.  
Other organizational elements that were significant included the range of groups 
that provided support, such as Amnesty International, Pride in London, Unite, the Green 
Party, and the Women’s Equality Party, as well as the Metropolitan Police. Humm (2017) 
reports how the latter appointed six female officers to help with the organization of the 
London March, and policed with a ‘light touch’. As in the case of the Washington 
Marches, no arrests were made. Along with many other posters and placards mobilizing 
wit and irony as powerful weapons against oppression (Murphy, 2017), were banners 
proclaiming ‘pussy power’. Many marchers wore pink, pussy ear head-bands (making 
reference to comments made by Trump about women’s bodies), and several banners 
declaring that ‘nasty women’ are tough, smart and vote could be seen not just in London, 
but in sister marches across the world (turning Trump’s reference to Hilary Clinton back 
on itself). But many of the placards and banners displayed in London were also statements 
conveying a sense of déjà vu, with one asking, for instance, ‘Haven’t we been here 
before?’ There is of course a risk of simplifying, even romanticizing the Marches as 
examples of feminist activism. Like the post-Pulse vigils, they were complex events, with 
concerns about commercial appropriation and exclusion being raised in the immediate 
aftermath; the protest group, Idle No More for instance, raised concerns about the 
marginalization of indigenous women’s concerns from the Marches via their Facebook 
posts.  
So while these marches were certainly not homogenous, for many, what was 
overwhelming about the experience of being immersed in them was the sense of embodied 
inter-connection, of assemblage in Butler’s terms – food and warm clothing were shared, 
strangers embraced, laughed, sang and shouted together. Social media and various 
feminist networks involved in their organization produced a sense that transnational 
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feminism, as a ‘new chapter’ or circuit in feminism’s narrative (Walby, 2011), has the 
capacity to create conditions for a revivified feminist solidarity characterized by a 
renewed sense of commitment and connection. The effective mobilization of social media 
to organize and garner support for the Marches, and their distinctive embodied, immersive 
materiality, literally showed us (or rather, reminded us, enabled us to recognize) what is 
possible when feminists assemble the combined forces of our bodies, practices and ethics. 
Likening the March to an ‘Outsiders Society’ (see Virginia Woolf’s Three 
Guineas), Maggie Humm (2017: 3) comments on the political effects of this in her 
account of the London March, citing Woolf’s observation that when we take to the streets 
‘we are no longer quite ourselves’; collectively, we become ek-static (Kenny, 2010). 
Evoking Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own Humm also recalls how on the day of the March, 
‘London itself seemed to turn into a gigantic autonomous women’s room’, a corporeal 
claim to a public space, as Butler has put it (cited in Humm, 2017: 5). For Humm, it is this 
recognition of the ‘multiple systems of oppression [that] we experience in our lives’ that 
brought those involved together. This kind of ek-statis takes us ‘beyond ourselves’ 
(Kenny, 2010), enabling a ‘standing outside of oneself’ (Butler, 2000: 277), immersed in a 
collective, performative assemblage through which we experience ourselves through/as 
each other. 
 In understanding how features of these two examples (the Pulse vigils, and the 
Women’s Marches) connect feminist thinking on embodied ethics to assemblage as a 
recognition-based form of activism, and in turn to our critique of inclusion, it is useful to 
remind ourselves of Butler’s emphasis on a collective presence as embodying the ethics 
and politics of assembly. For Butler is in this embodied ethico-politics of co-presence, 
based on mutual recognition of our inter-subjectivity, that opens up the possibility of a 
more critical alternative to the binary, instrumental championing of inclusion discussed 
above. Specifically, in her attempt to develop a performative politics of assembly, Butler 
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considers what forms of ethics and politics assemblies embody that might enable us to 
think about ‘organization’ in its broadest sense beyond inclusion as it is currently 
understood and practiced. In response to this kind of question, Butler (2015: 43) 
emphasizes her conviction that there has to be a way to ‘find and forge a set of bonds and 
alliances [that enable us] to link interdependency to the principle of equal value, and to do 
this in a way that opposes those powers that differentially allocate recognizability’.  
In this aspect of her writing, Butler comes closer to posing an organizational 
answer to this question than arguably ever before (developing some of the inroads made in 
Butler and Athanasiou, 2015), noting how ‘the ethical question, how ought I to live? or 
even the political question, how ought we to live together? depends upon an organization 
of life that makes it possible to entertain those questions meaningfully’ (Butler, 2015: 44, 
emphasis added). In pursuing a livable life beyond normative ‘inclusion’, the point is not 
therefore to court market recognition, or fall for what Povinelli (2002) calls the ‘cunning 
of recognition’, and hence not, as Butler puts it, ‘to rally for modes of equality that would 
plunge us all into equally unlivable conditions’ (Butler, 2015: 69). The opposite of 
marginalization is not inclusion, but ‘a livable interdependency’ (ibid: 69). It is this latter 
point that sets the basis for Butler’s response to Adorno’s question posed above, about 
how it might be possible to live a good life. It helps us to develop a critique not just of 
inclusion as an organized, conditional recognition, but also of the organizational processes 
and imperatives that exploit our need for recognition. At the same time, Butler’s notion of 
a livable interdependency requires a reflexive acknowledgement of our reliance on 
organizational processes and structures, as well as resources, that needs us to have 
considerable faith in the radical, democratic potential of social modes of organization, the 
latter having the capacity to act as ‘the space of sociality’ (ibid: 84). The vigils and 
marches considered above powerfully illustrate how this capacity might be organized in a 
highly embodied, relational way.  
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Underpinning Butler’s critique of inclusion, and its social (organizational) 
conditioning is the presumption that part of what the body is is an ontological claim to 
inter-dependency on others’ bodies and networks of support: ‘the body is entered into 
social life first and foremost under conditions of dependency’ (Butler, 2015: 130). This 
implies an ontological inter-connection premised upon shared vulnerability. It also brings 
to the fore, as the basis of feminist activism, a politics of mutual recognition premised 
upon that shared vulnerability (see Butler and Athanasiou, 2015). This understanding is 
one that calls into question a presumption of the discreetness and self-sufficiency of the 
human condition and of organizational recognition systems, or conditions of inclusion 
premised upon this approach. Mobilizing our mutual vulnerability, ‘the moment of 
actively appearing’, involves a deliberate risk of exposure (Butler, 2015: 140), including 
in and through an organizational politics of inclusion. This is the basis for Butler’s 
understanding of embodiment as our lived experience of social (organizational) life, and 
of its connection to assembly, as an ‘ecstatic relationality’ (Butler, 2015: 149; see Kenny, 
2010). The vigils and Marches discussed above gave those involved a sense of the 
political and cultural capacity of assembly, of an affirmative recognition of vulnerability, 
and of what can be achieved when people simply appear together, providing some 
momentum and encouragement on which contemporary feminist activism can build.  
 Returning to the theme of organizational practice raises the question of what kind 
of inclusion or ‘livable life’ might be possible or desirable given the ethical and political 
concerns raised by critical diversity scholars (Ahmed, 2012; Ahonen et al, 2014; Ahonen 
and Tienari, 2015; Oswick and Noon, 2014; Swan, 2016; Zanoni, 2011; Zanoni and 
Janssens, 2004, 2015; Zanoni et al, 2010) and the political potential embodied in the two 
forms of assembly examined above. This issue returns us to a consideration of the 
questions posed earlier, and to the task of connecting what a politics of assembly might 
offer to the organizational challenges of inclusion. Butler herself puts considerable faith in 
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the political possibilities opened up by ‘the collective assembling of bodies … that press 
up against the limits of social recognizability’ (Butler, 2015: 153). But what might this 
kind of critique, and of activism, actually mean for organizational practices and 
experiences?  
Turning to this theme, and drawing together insights from Butler’s discussion of 
assembly, from the feminist writing on embodied ethics and recognition considered above, 
from the critical diversity studies literature, and from the two examples of political 
activism examined, we might surmise that social solidarity emerges from mutual 
recognition of our embodied, relational multiplicity and shared inter-corporeal 
vulnerability rather than from a reified inclusion, or organization, of difference as a 
privative form of dispossession, in Butler’s terms. And so we need to find ways to support 
the potential for this emergence, through collective opportunities for mutual recognition. 
Yet how we accomplish this, in practical, organizational terms, remains challenging. It has 
been argued here that one possible way of approaching this task, and of re-thinking 
inclusion through an ethics of recognition, can be found in Butler’s (2015) writing on a 
feminist politics of assembly. The concept of assembly, and the recognition ethic on 
which it depends, may provide the basis for a way to think about how we might enact a 
better way of living, being and organizing together, or at least, as Butler (2015: 153) puts 
it, to reject the one that is currently ‘doing us in’. The priority then becomes one of 
thinking through how embodied assemblies based on mutual recognition of our inter-
corporeal relationality and ontological vulnerability might move us beyond the 
presumption of inclusion as an instrumental co-optation or strategic exclusion, to 
paraphrase Pullen and Rhodes (2015) into a recognition-based relationality as the basis of 
organizational life. However we frame it, it is recognition rather than reification that 
potentially opens up the way for us to re-think inclusion through feminist theory and 
Page 24 of 35
ScholarOne support: (434) 964-4100
Human Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
CONFIDENTIAL: for peer review only
 25
activism; recognizing that inclusion, as it is currently practiced, is a form of reification 
may in itself be a simple but important step towards this. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
Butler’s concern is that inclusion ‘seeks to govern and enclose subjectivity and 
relationality’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 66, emphasis added). As a reminder, the term 
‘inclusion’ derives from the Latin ‘to shut in’ or enclose. Her recognition-based critique 
implies that what is needed, politically and ethically, is a destabilization of the regulatory 
ideals that shape this process, and our susceptibility to it. For her, it is in connecting 
feminist thinking to activism, through assembly as an embodied, ethical and therefore 
political practice, that this becomes possible rather than through normative regimes such 
as ‘inclusion’. The latter, she argues, is akin to a privative form of dispossession that, in 
Ahmed’s (2000) terms, simply takes the form of an organizational version of the ‘stranger 
fetish’ and is an exploitation of our basic relationality, foreclosing rather than supporting 
genuine recognition. 
Questioning inclusion is a risky business of course. Butler is particularly critical of 
what Povinelli (2002: 108) calls the ‘cunning of recognition’, referring to neo-liberalism’s 
capacity to reproduce established power relations and norms of recognition in the name of 
tolerance and inclusion. Yet pursuing a relational rather than ‘cunning’, market-orientated 
form of recognition poses risks. Not least, moving from a norm of ‘inclusivity’ premised 
upon tolerance (risking over-inclusion, or conditional inclusion), to a recognition-based 
ethic of relationality, requires taking the risk of living in a critical relation to its 
governmental norms and the relative security that inclusion proffers. And so an uncritical, 
unreflexive collusion is tempting in that respect alone. Further, having fought to join the 
party, so to speak (that is, having championed ‘inclusion’ as an alternative to the business-
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case dominated ‘managing diversity’ – see above), it seems somewhat churlish to refuse 
the invitation. But the risks associated with questioning inclusion are not just political or 
tactical, but ontological as well. Challenging the conditions of inclusion implies ‘living in 
a critical relation to the norms of the intelligible’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 67), 
further perpetuating what is likely to be an already precarious, outsider status; saying, ‘I 
don’t recognize the terms on which you are offering to recognize me’ is a very difficult 
position to be in, or to ask others to adopt particularly when our livelihoods or even our 
very lives might be at stake. Assiter (2017) touches on this in her recent discussion of the 
Women’s Marches, considering the immediate and longer terms risks to freedom, as well 
as physical and emotional well being that resistance can engender.  
 Wherever we go with this, taken together, what this suggests is that inclusion as an 
organizational form of recognition ‘is not in itself an unambiguous good, however 
desperate we are for its rewards’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 82), particularly if the 
terms - of an assimilatory, conditional over-inclusion - are not of our making, and because 
of the associated costs and conditions attached to being included, or even to pursuing 
inclusion. If the freedom to be oneself, and therefore to be open to and for others, within 
the world of work is one that only ‘some’ have won, inclusion remains conditional upon 
(i) adding something deemed to be of value; (ii) accommodation to dominant norms, and 
(iii) making the ‘right’ (complicit) choices. Arguably, this means simply replicating rather 
than tackling hierarchies of recognition in the name of ‘inclusion’.  
This returns us to the question of how as organizational scholars, as feminist 
theorists and activists, we might move beyond this, into a more relational, recognition 
based way of living and working together. Framed another way, as an ongoing 
consideration, how can the strength and solidarity that was mobilized across the world in 
the aftermath of the Pulse nightclub shootings in June 2016, or the politics in evidence at 
the Women’s Marches across the world in January 2017 be drawn on, and made part of 
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our everyday ways of organizing, as the basis of how we relate to, and understand, one 
another? At this particular point in time, it seems that simply asking these kinds of 
questions constitutes an important step towards rethinking inclusion as an organizational 
‘good’, as something that managerial discourses espouse as ‘enriching and empowering’ 
(Puwar, 2004, cited in Ahmed, 2012), through an emphasis on an embodied ethics of 
mutual recognition. To borrow from Benjamin (1990: 221) what this implies is not 
undoing our ties to others - on the contrary, but to ‘make of them not shackles but circuits 
of recognition’.  
 To return to where we began, in her final essay in Notes Towards a Performative 
Theory of Assembly, Butler (2015) follows up on Adorno’s question of how it might be 
possible to live a good life in a bad one. She notes how Adorno underscores the difficulty 
of finding a way to pursue a good life for oneself, as oneself, in the context of a broader 
world that is structured by inequality and exploitation. Of course many different views on 
what the good life might be have emerged, including within work and organization studies 
– many have taken it to mean economic well being, prosperity and security, or self-
realization, but many claim to live a good life while prospering on the exploitation or 
effacement of others, entrenching inequality, living a socio-economically ‘good’ life 
because of an ethically ‘bad’ one. So the good life has to be defined and lived so that it 
does not presuppose inequality and exploitation. But throughout this paper, it has been 
argued that the pursuit of a good life cannot be unproblematically associated with an 
embracing or celebration of inclusion either. This raises the rhetorical question explored at 
the outset of the paper: Is inclusion too contaminated, conscripted into neo-liberal 
discourse, to be useful to those who want to re-think the relationship between ethics, 
embodiment and organization? When Adorno raises his question about living a good life 
in a bad one, he is asking us to think about the relationship between moral conduct and 
social conditions, or more specifically, about how relations of power and domination enter 
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into, or disrupt, our sense of how best to live together. For the feminist writers whose 
work has been considered here, ethics is always socially situated, inter-subjective, 
embodied and relational. But Adorno also reminds us of the bind in which we are situated, 
of the need to undertake self-criticism of our compulsion to establish ourselves in terms 
that make our lives recognizable. As he puts it, ‘we ought also to mobilize our own 
powers of resistance in order to resist those parts of us that are tempted to join in’ (cited 
in Butler, 2015: 216, emphasis added). In organizational terms, this emphasizes that we 
need a politics that can expose the collusive contradictions at the heart of inclusion; 
namely, that organizations can accentuate oppression while professing to do precisely the 
opposite. In the name of inclusion, organizational life continues to exploit our need for 
recognition. What the feminist theories and forms of activism considered here emphasize 
are (i) the need to re-think inclusion beyond its current organizational and organizing form 
and (ii) one possible means by which we might do so, shifting beyond a regulatory 
reification to a more recognition-based relationality as a way of thinking about, and 
enacting, how our lives might be (re)assembled differently.  
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i An ethico-politics of recognition has certainly not been without its critics within feminist 
thinking, however. Louis McNay (2008: 294) has argued for instance, that because 
recognition theory falsely unifies the diversity of political conflicts through a 
homogenizing unification of them as a basic ontological struggle, feminist thinking and 
activism should ‘dispense with the idea of recognition’.  
ii
 To paraphrase Spivak (1993, cited in Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 76), inclusion (in the 
form of employability, for instance) as an organizational form of liberal, market 
recognition becomes ‘that which we cannot not want’. 
iii Vachhani (2012) builds on this critique by arguing that in the case of the so-called 
‘women in management’ literature, the attribution of value to women’s essentialized 
capacity to care simply reifies the same hierarchy that perpetuates exclusion, rather than 
providing a politically or ethically credible alternative.  
iv
 Pullen (2006: 277) considers how this binary fundamentalism impacts not just on 
organizational practices and experiences, but on the social positioning of the research self, 
arguing that this positioning typically requires researchers to ‘do one of two things’: to 
suppress difference, or to adopt a position that ‘fails to do justice to the complex and 
unstable multiplicity that underpins the research self’. 
v
 These ideas draw heavily on De Beauvoir’s (1976: 82) argument that our 
interdependence ‘explains why oppression is possible and why it is hateful’; it is an 
exploitation of our mutual, but socially situated (and therefore hierarchically organised), 
vulnerability. 
vi
 To illustrate, Butler’s recognition-based critique of dispossession proceeds from her 
acknowledgement that ‘being dispossessed by the other’s presence and by our own 
presence to the other is the only way to be present to one another’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 
2013: 17). We can also see strong echoes of Butler’s Hegelian thinking when she 
describes recognition as the process by which human beings are construed as social 
subjects on ‘normative and disciplinary terms’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013: 90) with the 
latter regulating inter-subjectivity by defining ‘what renders a subject legible, 
recognizable, desirable’ (ibid: 94). 
vii
 See Giving an Account of Oneself (Butler, 2005) for a more sustained discussion of 
relationality and ethics. 
viii
 Drawing on Butler, I use the term ‘performative labour’ here to refer to the expenditure 
of time, effort and skills required in order to bring particular subjectivities into being 
through the work involved in conforming to normative regimes of intelligibility and 
recognition. 
 
x To date, this attack is the deadliest mass shooting in US history 
(https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/mass-shootings-timeline.html?_r=0). 
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xi Ganesh (2017) and Park (2016) both acknowledge the sad irony attached to the way in 
which victims of tragedies such as the Pulse shootings and other violent or accidental 
deaths are connected to ‘next of kin’ heteronormatively so that the ‘right’ to grieve is 
attributed to (biological) families, who may or may not have been accepting or supportive 
beforehand. This heteronormative regulation means that partners, friends and other loved 
ones from within the LGBTQ communities, a person’s ‘queer kin’, often end up being 
excluded. Park describes this normative governance as a ‘straightening of grief’. 
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